

TABLE 6 – 2026 REMUNERATION POLICY SUMMARY

Market References	
Chief Executive Officer and General Manager (CEO/GM):	Remuneration peer group consisting of European companies in the Energy and Utilities sector and other comparable industrial sectors: <i>Shell, TotalEnergies, BP, Repsol, Equinor, OMV, RWE, Iberdrola, E.ON, ENGIE, Enel, BASF, Bayer, Rio Tinto, Anglo American, Volkswagen, Vodafone, Siemens.</i>
Chief Operating Officers and Other Managers with Strategic Responsibilities (MSRs):	European market selected in the industrial sector for roles with the same level of responsibility.
Fixed Remuneration	
Purpose and Conditions	Reward skills, experience and responsibility
Criteria and Parameters	CEO/GM: Fixed remuneration up to a maximum limit of €1,970,000, which may be reduced based on the assigned roles and powers, and the profile of the nominee. MSRs: Fixed remuneration is based on the role assigned, potentially adjusted to median market remuneration level.
Short-term Incentive Plan	
Purpose and Conditions	Motivate to achieve annual targets in a perspective of medium/long-term sustainability The Plan is subject to malus/clawback conditions. 2026 targets for the CEO/GM (Plan targets have been adjusted in line with the evolution of Eni's guidelines and stakeholder interests, as well as best practices in the sector) - Economic/financial and equity results: EBT (20%); organic Free Cash Flow (25%); Gearing (20%); - Environmental sustainability and human capital: Net upstream Scope 1 and Scope 2 GHG emissions (20%); Severity Incident Rate (15%); 2026 MSR Targets: Business and individual targets set on the basis of those assigned to the CEO/GM and the responsibilities assigned to them. Assessment - performance scale: 70 - 150 points (target = 100; below 70 points the result is calculated as zero); - minimum incentive threshold: 85 total performance points; - possible application to the CEO's performance score of an adjustment coefficient of 1.1 for operations and/or results of particular strategic significance (with a maximum score of no more than 150 points) or of 0.9 for adverse scenarios and extraordinarily negative economic-financial results (with a minimum score of no less than 85 points).
Criteria and Parameters	CEO/GM incentive level - Incentive base: 150% of fixed remuneration; - Vested incentive: between 85% and 150% of incentive base, with an annual portion (65%) and deferred portion (35%) subject to performance conditions in a three-year period and disbursed in a variable amount between 28% and 230% of the awarded portion. - Annual amount payable: - threshold of 83% of fixed remuneration; - target of 98% of fixed remuneration; - max. 146% of fixed remuneration. - Payable deferred portion: - threshold of 38% of fixed remuneration; - target of 68% of fixed remuneration; - max. 181% of fixed remuneration. MSRs incentive level Incentive base: up to a maximum of 100% of fixed remuneration; - Annual amount payable: up to a maximum of 98% of fixed remuneration; - Payable deferred portion: up to a maximum of 121% of fixed remuneration.
Long-term Equity-based Incentive Plan 2026-2028	
Purpose and Conditions	Encourage long-term value creation for shareholders and sustainability. The Plan is subject to malus/clawback conditions and 50% of the shares granted are restricted for 2 years after the grant date; for the CEO/GM, assuming annual grants of equivalent value, this requirement results in a shareholding objective, achievable within 2 years, of a value equal to 1.5 times the fixed remuneration.
Criteria and Parameters	No. of shares awarded Determined by the ratio between the monetary value and the price of the award, calculated as the average of the daily prices recorded in the four months before the month in which the Board approves the award. Three-year targets 25% Market Target: Total Shareholder Return (relative); 40% Financial and Equity Targets (absolute): 25% Organic Free Cash Flow and 15% Gearing; 35% Environmental Sustainability and Energy Transition objectives (absolute): 20% Net upstream Scope 1 and Scope 2 GHG emissions and 15% Biojet production capacity.

Performance measurement over a 3-year period

- Relative parameters: measured against the Peer Group of six European energy companies (Shell, TotalEnergies, BP, Repsol, Equinor and OMV);
- Absolute parameters: measured against targets set in the Strategic Plan.

No. of shares assigned at the end of the vesting period

Determined as a function of the results over the three-year period, keeping the threshold (40%) and maximum (180%) multipliers unchanged and if over performance is achieved, introducing a multiplier of up to 235%.

**INCENTIVE
LEVEL**

CEO/GM:

- Value of awarded shares: max amount unchanged, equal to 150% of total fixed remuneration.
- Value of granted shares:
 - threshold of 60% of fixed remuneration;
 - target of 183.75% of fixed remuneration;
 - max. 270% of fixed remuneration;
 - over performance 352.5% of fixed remuneration.

MSRs:

- Value of awarded shares: depending on the level of the role, up to 75% of fixed remuneration.
- Value of granted shares: depending on the level of the role, up to 135% of fixed remuneration, or up to 176% of fixed remuneration in the case of over performance.

N.B.: the monetary values are net of the impact of any changes in the stock price.

PUBLIC COMPANY STOCK PLAN 2024-2026

PURPOSE

Strengthen the sense of belonging for Eni people, participation in growing company value, in line with the interests of shareholders, while also supporting purchasing power.

**CRITERIA AND
PARAMETERS**

The Plan provides for three annual assignments from 2024-2026 and, in particular, for 2024 and 2025, two assignments of Eni shares free of charge for an individual monetary value of €2,000, while for 2026 a co-investment method will be utilised which calls for the assignment of shares free of charge by the company against the purchase of Eni shares by the employee, utilising a 50% matching mechanism up to a maximum of €1,000. Shares will be subject to a three year lock-up clause, for shares assigned free of charge, and a one year lock-up for any shares purchased by employees.

For the CEO/GM, Managers with Strategic Responsibilities and Executives participating in the LTI Equity-Based Plan, the assignment of a single symbolic share is envisaged. For more detailed information, including the cost and share capital, please see the Information Document for the Plan^(a).

OTHER TREATMENTS

BENEFITS

PURPOSE

Retain managers in the Company

**CRITERIA AND
PARAMETERS**

Benefits, mainly insurance and welfare related, defined in national collective bargaining agreement and in supplementary company level agreements for Executives (including the CEO and MSRs).

- Supplementary pension scheme;
- Supplementary healthcare scheme;
- Insurance;
- Car for business and personal use.

PAYMENTS DUE IN THE EVENT OF TERMINATION OF OFFICE OR EMPLOYMENT

PURPOSE

Protect the Company from potential litigation and/or competitive risks associated with terminations without just cause

**TERMINATION
INDEMNITY**

For the role of CEO: equal to two years of fixed remuneration (in line with Recommendation 2009/385/EC) in the case of early termination of a term or non-renewal, and in cases of dismissal for just cause following an essential reduction of powers. For the role of General Manager: indemnity in the case of consensual termination equal to two years of fixed and short-term remuneration, within the limits of the protections established in the collective bargaining agreement^(b) (CCNL).

Indemnities are not due in the event of dismissal for "just cause" and resignation not justified by a reduction of delegated powers.

For **Managers with Strategic Responsibilities**, as for all Eni executives, there are various treatments agreed upon individually based on criteria established by Eni for cases of retirement incentives which take into account the role held and performance, within the limits of the protections established in the same CCNL^(b) which call for, in the case of terminations without just cause, a maximum of three years of total actual remuneration, including the notice.

**NON-COMPETE
AGREEMENT**

CEO/GM: for the 2026-2029 term, to protect the Company's interests, a non-compete agreement may be continued and/or established, which is activated at the sole discretion of the Board of Directors, through an option right with a value of €300,000.

Agreement Requirements

- validity: 18 months;
- non-compete constraints: for the Oil & Gas sector, this includes 19 countries, updated to also include companies in the Circular Economy sector.

Agreement Payment

- fixed component: €1.8 million;
- variable component: determined as a function of the average of results for the STI Plan in the previous three years, between €500,000 (performance target) and €1,000,000 (maximum performance).

MSRs: Only for cases of termination presenting high-competitive risks relating to the nature of the position; payment based on current remuneration levels and the extension of period and commitments undertaken.

(a) Prepared pursuant to Article 114-bis of Legislative Decree 58 of February 24, 1998 and Article 84-bis of the Consob Issuers Regulation (resolution 11971 of May 14, 1999), published on the Company's website in the "Governance/Remuneration" section in compliance with current regulations.

(b) In cases of termination not due to just cause, CCNL protections call for up to a maximum of 36 months of total remuneration (fixed remuneration, variable short and long-term incentives, benefits), including that due by way of notice indemnity, consistent with national regulations (article 2121, Civil Code).